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Summary Points
• Four global commissions reviewing the recent Ebola virus disease epidemic response
consistently recommended strengthening national health systems, consolidating and
strengthening World Health Organization (WHO) emergency and outbreak response
activities, and enhancing research and development.
• System-wide accountability is vital to effectively prevent, detect, and respond to future
global health emergencies.
• Global leaders (e.g., United Nations, World Health Assembly, G7, and G20) should
maintain continuous oversight of global health preparedness, and ensure effective implementation of the Ebola commissions’ key recommendations, including sustainable and
scalable financing.

The world is becoming increasingly vulnerable to pandemics resulting from globalization,
urbanization, intense human/animal interchange, and climate change. A series of global health
crises have emerged since 2000, ranging from Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and
its phylogenetic cousin Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), to pandemic Influenza A
(H1N1), Ebola, and the ongoing Zika virus epidemic. The Ebola epidemic gave rise to four
global commissions proposing a bold new agenda for global health preparedness and response
for future infectious disease threats [1–7].
The four commissions, listed in chronological order are: 1) the World Health Organization
(WHO) Ebola Interim Assessment Panel (WHO Interim Assessment); 2) the Harvard University and the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine’s Independent Panel on the
Global Response to Ebola (Harvard/LSHTM); 3) the Commission on a Global Health Risk
Framework for the Future (CGHRF) convened by the US National Academy of Medicine; and
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4) the United Nations High-Level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises (UN Panel).
In response to critiques of WHO’s performance during the Ebola crisis, the World Health
Assembly (WHA) approved an Advisory Group on Reform of WHO’s Work in Outbreaks and
Emergencies, which reported in January 2016. The WHA also approved a Review Committee
on the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), due to report in May [8].
The commissions were established to critically evaluate the national and global response to
Ebola and to enhance preparedness to prevent, detect, and respond to future infectious disease
threats. Each commission had its own membership and funding described in S1 Table, but had
similar mandates to improve global health security. Given the major threat posed by infectious
diseases, these panel reports should drive the agendas of the WHA and the G7 Summit in 2016,
and global leaders should then maintain heightened oversight of global health preparedness
going forward.
Pandemics pose a significant risk to security, economic stability, and development. The
CGHRF estimated annualized expected losses from pandemics at $60 billion per year—$6 trillion in the 21st century—yet the global community has significantly underestimated and
under-invested in pandemic threats. CGHRF recommended an annual incremental investment
of $4.5 billion—65 cents per person—to strengthen global preparedness. This modest investment would provide a major security dividend.
This article focuses on three major reform dimensions—national health systems, global governance, and research and development—and offers a set of priorities drawing on the findings
of all four commissions. S1 and S2 Tables compare the four commissions’ reports along these
dimensions. To make the world safer, we need robust health systems; an empowered WHO,
with strengthened response capacities; a well-funded and planned research and development
strategy; and system-wide accountability.

National Health Systems
Robust and sustainable health systems are an indispensable prerequisite for health security.
The IHR—the governing framework for managing infectious disease outbreaks—requires 196
States Parties to develop and maintain core health system capacities to detect, assess, report,
and respond to potential public health emergencies of international concern (PHEIC) [9]. Core
capacities include a health workforce, laboratories, data systems, and risk communication to
identify and contain threats before they cross national borders (Fig 1). The initial target date
for establishing these capacities was June 2012 [10].
WHO has traditionally measured national health capacities by allowing states to conduct
annual self-assessments. Most states, however, missed the initial 2012 reporting requirement
for meeting IHR core capacities and, in 2014, WHO extended the deadline to 2016 for all 81
states that requested extensions. Of the 193 states required to report, only 64 states reported
meeting core capacities, representing a compliance rate of just over 30%, while 48 failed to even
respond [10]. This low level of compliance for meeting minimum core capacity standards may
be an overestimate because self-assessments are unreliable without independent validation.
Table 1 highlights the commissions’ recommendations to develop and assess core capacities.
The WHO took an important step in February 2016, developing a Joint External Evaluation
Tool to evaluate IHR capacities every 5 years, with national and international subject experts
reviewing self-reported data, followed by a country visit and in-depth discussions. Each country’s assessment will be made public, with a color-coding scheme to delineate implementation
levels for each capacity [11]. Until governments achieve a high degree of compliance with IHR
obligations, however, WHO should plan more frequent external assessments, rather than
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Fig 1. IHR Core Capacities.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002042.g001

Table 1. Recommendations from the Four Global Commissions Concerning National Health Systems—Core Capacity Compliance.
CGHRF

Harvard/LSHTM

UN Panel

WHO Interim Assessment

Development of IHR
Core Capacities

By mid-2017, all countries should
develop and publish plans to
achieve and maintain their IHR
core capacities. (Rec. B.6)

The global community must
agree on a clear plan for
national governments to invest
domestically in building IHR
core capacities. (Rec. 1)

No recommendation.

WHO should create a costed and
prioritized plan for all countries to
develop IHR core capacities.
Financing should be provided in
partnership with the World Bank.
(Rec. 1)

Assessment of IHR
Core Capacities

By the end of 2016, WHO should
devise a regular, independent,
transparent, and objective
assessment mechanism for
evaluating IHR core capacities.
(Rec. B.2) All countries should
consent to external assessment.
(Rec. B.3) WHO and its member
states should agree on precise
benchmarks for evaluating core
capacities that go beyond standard
implementation checklists. (Rec.
B.1)

All countries must agree to
regular, independent, external
assessment of their IHR core
capacities. (Rec. 1)

WHO should strengthen its periodic
review of compliance with IHR core
capacity requirements to ensure that
all member states are subject to an
independent, ﬁeld-based
assessment at least once every four
years on a rotating basis. After an
assessment is completed, WHO’s
Secretariat should follow up within 3
months with a costed action plan to
address any deﬁciencies. (Rec. 6)

Assessment of IHR core capacities
must be based on independently
assessed information, validated
through some form of peer review or
other external assessment. (Rec. 1)

Deadline for
Compliance with
IHR Core Capacity
Requirements

By 2020, all countries should be
fully compliant with IHR core
capacity requirements. (Rec. B.6)

No recommendation.

By 2020, all state parties to the IHR
should be in full compliance with the
core capacities requirements.
(Rec. 1)

No recommendation.

doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002042.t001
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waiting 5 years between assessments. Participation of stakeholders in the community should
also be a critical component of assessments.
A major weakness of WHO’s new mechanism for monitoring the core capacities of states is
that it is voluntary, reflecting state sovereignty concerns. Ensuring compliance with IHR obligations, even with better reporting, requires creative incentives, technical and financial support,
and transparency. Table 2 highlights the commissions’ recommendations on financing and
incentives towards ensuring countries report their core capacities and meet their minimum
IHR obligations. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) could encourage countries to participate in ongoing evaluations by incorporating pandemic preparedness into its evaluation of
macroeconomic stability [4]. IMF assessments offer a powerful inducement given their influence over countries’ access to capital. Similarly, the World Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Facility—along with regional development banks—could condition disbursements based on
governments meeting IHR obligations.
Political leaders are more likely to cooperate if they view external evaluations as a pathway
to funding and technical support. Consequently, WHO should not simply give countries a
pass/fail grade; rather, it should constructively partner with governments. Core capacity
financing, however, requires the international community to close an investment gap of $3.4
billion per year [4]. WHO and the World Bank should develop a financial plan, with targets for
national and international contributions. Additional financing mechanisms could be modeled
on the Global Fund, with the World Bank and WHO hosting periodic donor investment and
replenishment conferences.
The Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), a partnership initiated by the United States
encompassing nearly 50 countries, which was set up to prevent, detect, and respond to future
infectious disease outbreaks, could offer a model for strengthening health systems [12]. GHSA,
with >$1 billion in funding, has developed “Action Packages,” where priority technical areas
are identified, with each encompassing a target and action items, along with baseline
Table 2. Recommendations from the Four Global Commissions Concerning National Health Systems—Core Capacity Financing and Incentives.
CGHRF

Harvard/LSHTM

UN Panel

WHO Interim
Assessment

Technical &
Financial
Assistance

WHO should provide technical
support to countries to ﬁll gaps in
IHR core capacities. WHO’s
Centre for Health Emergency
Preparedness & Response
support should coordinate this
support. (Rec. B.7) The World
Bank should convene its
development partners to provide
ﬁnancial assistance to lowermiddle and low-income countries.
(Rec. B.9)

Adequate external support
should be provided to
supplement efforts to build IHR
core capacities in poorer
countries. (Rec. 1)

The WHO Director-General (DG)
should lead efforts to mobilize both
ﬁnancial and technical support to
build IHR core capacities, in
partnership with the World Bank,
donors, foundations, and the private
sector. (Rec. 17)

No
recommendation.

Incentives for
Participating in
Core Capacity
Assessments

The World Bank, bilateral donors,
and multilateral donors should
make funding of health systems
contingent on the participation of
the recipient in the external
assessment process. (Rec. B.4)
The IMF should include pandemic
preparedness in its assessments
of individual countries. (Rec. B.5)

No recommendation.

No recommendation.

No
recommendation.

doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002042.t002
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Table 3. Recommendations from the Four Global Commissions Concerning National Health Systems—Key Components.
CGHRF

Harvard/LSHTM

UN Panel

WHO Interim Assessment

Training of
Health
Professionals

No recommendation.

No
recommendation.

Governments should increase
spending on training health
professionals, particularly
community health workers, who
are most familiar with the local
culture. (Rec. 2)

No recommendation.

Community
Engagement

Governments and WHO should
increase engagement with non-state
actors, including community leaders,
civil society organizations, the private
sector, and the media. (Rec. C.6)

No
recommendation.

Governments and responders
must streamline their community
engagement to promote local
ownership and trust. (Rec. 3)

WHO and its partners must ensure
that appropriate community
engagement is a core function
when managing a health
emergency. (Rec. 15)

No recommendation.

No
recommendation.

Efforts to improve outbreak
preparedness and response must
include women at all levels of
planning and operations and must
take women’s needs into account,
as they most often act as primary
care-givers. (Rec. 4)

No recommendation.

Gender
Inclusion

doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002042.t003

assessment, planning, and monitoring activities, and capabilities evaluated through a peer
assessment process [13]. GHSA, however, formally stands outside the IHR framework, thus
lacking the international legitimacy of a WHO-led process.
The minimum core capacities set out by the IHR on their own are insufficient to respond to
public health threats and emergencies, however, as highlighted by the commissions’ recommendations in Table 3. Effective primary care and public health systems that underpin inclusive, high-quality universal health coverage (UHC) are also required to manage outbreaks and
meet a broad range of health needs to ensure the right to health. Fast-spreading novel infections are diverse, demanding resilient health systems. As outbreaks stretch existing resources,
resilient systems that are designed to ensure surge capacity in health emergencies are needed.
The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) expressly encompass infectious disease
outbreaks and set a target for UHC by 2030 [14]. Many of the commissions’ recommendations
fall within the SDGs’ framework as described in S2 Table. The SDGs, in supporting universal
health systems, stress health equity, which is also vital because outbreaks often emerge in marginalized communities and then rapidly spread.
Achieving resilient health systems is a shared national and global responsibility. By 2017,
every government should develop and publish concrete plans to achieve IHR core capacities by
2020. By the end of the following decade, all nations should achieve the SDG target of health
coverage for all.

Global Governance for Health
The commissions’ reports reflecting on the Ebola epidemic echoed a crucial point made by the
IHR Review Committee on the response to the H1N1 pandemic in its 2011 report—“the world
is ill-prepared for a severe pandemic or for any similarly global, sustained and threatening public health emergency” [15]. At an international level, the commissions’ reports focused on
reforms for WHO and the UN System, but also discussed the role of the World Bank and
World Trade Organization (WTO) (Table 4).
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Table 4. Recommendations from the Four Global Commissions Concerning Global Governance—International Coordination.

Pandemic Emergency
Financing Facility

Coordination
Between WHO and
WTO on Trade and
Health

CGHRF

Harvard/LSHTM

UN Panel

WHO Interim
Assessment

By the end of 2016, the World Bank
should establish a Pandemic Emergency
Financing Facility as a rapidly deployable
source of funds to support pandemic
response. (Rec. C.9)

No
recommendation.

The World Bank should expeditiously
operationalize its Pandemic Emergency
Financing Facility. (Rec. 21)

No
recommendation.

No recommendation.

No
recommendation.

The WTO and WHO should convene a
joint commission to ensure that their
respective legal frameworks apply
consistent standards with respect to
trade restrictions imposed for public
health reasons. (Rec. 24)

No
recommendation.

doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002042.t004

World Health Organization
If national health systems are the foundation for global health security, WHO is at the apex [16].
Yet WHO faces a crisis of confidence, with major critiques of its performance during Ebola. The
Organization had previously cut nearly two-thirds of its emergency response unit; delayed fourand-a-half months before declaring a PHEIC; and lacked the governance needed to coordinate
multiple stakeholders, including its regional and country offices [17]. As featured in the recommendations in Table 5, the commissions called for emergency preparedness and response to
become “a core part of WHO’s mandate, positioning itself as an operational organization” [8].
The commissions also unanimously recommended that WHO create a Centre for Emergency
Preparedness and Response (CEPR), integrating and strengthening all its preparedness, response,
Table 5. Recommendations from the Four Global Commissions Concerning Global Governance—WHO Emergency Operations and Response
Reform.
CGHRF

Harvard/LSHTM

UN Panel

WHO Interim Assessment

Independent Centre
for Preparedness &
Response

WHO should create a Centre
for Health Emergency
Preparedness & Response
(CHEPR), governed by an
independent Technical
Governing Board, to
coordinate global outbreak
preparedness and response.
(Rec. C.1)

WHO should create a uniﬁed
Centre for Emergency
Preparedness & Response
with clear responsibility,
adequate capacity, and strong
lines of accountability. (Rec. 3)

WHO’s Program for
Outbreaks & Emergency
Management should be
converted into a Centre for
Emergency Preparedness &
Response (CEPR) with
uniﬁed command and control
authority. (Rec. 7)

WHO should establish a
Centre for Emergency
Preparedness & Response
that integrates its outbreak
control and humanitarian
functions. (Rec. 11) An
independent board should
oversee the Centre and
provide an annual global
health security report to the
WHA and UN GA. (Rec. 12)

Create Contingency
Fund for Rapid
Response

By the end of 2016, WHO
should create a sustainable
contingency fund of US$100
million to support rapid
deployment of emergency
response capabilities. (Rec.
C.3)

No recommendation.

WHO should establish a
contingency fund for
emergency response,
managed by the CEPR.
Member States should
provide at least US$300
million in ﬁnancing. (Rec. 20)

Member States and partners
should contribute to a
contingency fund in support of
outbreak response, with a
minimum target capitalization
of US$100 million. (Rec. 8)

Communications &
Outbreak Monitoring

WHO should generate a
high-priority “watch list” of
outbreaks, released daily to
national focal points and
weekly to the public. (Rec.
C.7)

Responsibility for declaring a
PHEIC should be delegated to
a transparent and politically
protected WHO standing
committee. (Rec. 4)

WHO must re-establish itself
as the authoritative body for
health emergencies, capable
of rapidly and accurately
informing governments and
the public about the severity
and extent of an outbreak.
(Rec. 14)

The IHR Review Committee
should consider the creation
of an intermediate level of
emergency to alert the
international community at an
earlier stage of a health crisis
before it becomes a global
threat. (Rec. 5)

doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002042.t005
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and humanitarian activities. The Centre would have a clear mandate, separate funding streams,
and strong lines of accountability. An Executive Director (at the Deputy Director-General level)
would lead the Centre, reporting to an independent oversight body. CGHRF recommended a
Technical Governing Board comprised of independent experts to hold the CEPR accountable.
Member States have resisted providing the funding needed for WHO to fulfill its global
mandate, and most existing funding is earmarked. The absence of sustainable and scalable
financing could diminish WHO’s capacity to manage future outbreaks. Table 6 highlights the
Table 6. Recommendations from the Four Global Commissions Concerning Global Governance—Ongoing WHO Reform.
CGHRF
Increase Member
State Assessed
Contributions

Harvard/LSHTM

UN Panel

WHO Interim Assessment

In May 2016, the WHA should
agree to appropriately
increase WHO Member
States’ core contributions in
order to provide sustainable
ﬁnancing for the CHEPR.
(Rec. C.2)

No recommendation.

Member States should
increase contributions to the
WHO budget by at least 10
percent. Ten percent of all
voluntary contributions to the
WHO budget should be
earmarked to support the
CEPR. (Rec. 18 & 19)

At the 2016 WHA meeting,
Member States should
consider moving from zero
nominal growth in assessed
contributions to an increase of
5 percent. (Rec. 7)

No recommendation.

WHO should focus on its core
functions and implement good
governance reforms. (Rec. 9
& 10)

No recommendation.

WHO must develop an
organizational culture for
emergency preparedness and
response. (Rec. 10)

Integrating
Regional & SubRegional Networks

WHO should strengthen its
linkages with regional and
sub-regional networks to
enhance mutual support and
trust, to promote sharing of
information and laboratory
resources, and facilitate joint
outbreak investigations
among neighboring countries.
(Rec. C.5)

No recommendation.

WHO should support the efforts
of regional and sub-regional
organizations to develop and
strengthen their standing
capacities to monitor, prevent,
and respond to health crises.
(Rec. 5)

No recommendation.

Country-Speciﬁc
Stafﬁng &
Planning

WHO should work with the
UN Secretary-General (SG)
and other UN bodies to
develop strategies for
sustaining health system
capabilities and infrastructure
in failed states and in war
zones. (Rec. B.10)

No recommendation.

No recommendation.

WHO must take local
circumstances into account
when stafﬁng its country
ofﬁces. WHO representatives
must have the full support of
regional directors and the
WHO DG if challenged by
national governments. (Rec.
13)

Renegotiate the
Pandemic
Inﬂuenza
Preparedness
Framework

No recommendation.

No recommendation.

WHO member states should
re-negotiate the Pandemic
Inﬂuenza Preparedness
Framework to include other
novel pathogens and make it
legally binding. (Rec. 15)

No recommendation.

Holding National
Governments
Accountable

The WHA should agree on
new mechanisms for holding
national governments publicly
accountable for their
performance under the IHR,
including protocols to prevent
delays in reporting and
protocols for avoiding
unnecessary restrictions on
travel and trade. (Rec. C.8)

WHO should publicly
commend countries that
rapidly share information and
publish lists of countries that
delay reporting. Funders
should create incentives for
early reporting by disbursing
emergency assistance
rapidly. WHO must confront
governments that implement
travel and trade restrictions
without justiﬁcation. (Rec. 2)

The IHR Review Committee
should develop mechanisms to
rapidly address unilateral
action by member states in
contravention of temporary
recommendations issued by
WHO as part of a PHEIC
announcement. (Rec. 23)

The IHR Review Committee
should consider ﬁnancial
incentives for early reporting,
including insurance to mitigate
adverse economic effects.
The Committee also should
consider ﬁnancial
disincentives to discourage
countries from restricting trade
and travel beyond measures
recommended by WHO. (Rec.
3 & 4)

Operations &
Governance

doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002042.t006
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commissions’ recommendations regarding WHO’s ongoing reforms. As WHO’s emergency
operational capacities are upgraded, states must not cut funding for its other core activities,
including noncommunicable diseases, injuries, and mental health—the Harvard/LSHTM panel
recommended “its functions should be far more circumscribed” [3].
In March 2016, the Secretariat launched WHO’s Health Emergencies Programme to assure
“cross-organizational standards and rapid decision-making in health emergency operations” [7].
The Programme’s development was influenced by the Advisory Group on Reform of WHO’s
Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies, whose recommendations are highlighted in Table 7.
Table 7. Recommendations of the WHO Advisory Group.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Advisory Group on Reform of WHO’s Work in Outbreaks and Emergencies

Independent Center for Preparedness & Response

WHO should establish a centrally-managed global Programme for Outbreaks and
Emergencies to integrate the functions of units at all three organizational levels (country,
regional, and headquarters) that work on risk analysis and assessment and on preparedness
and response. The Programme should have one budget and a single workforce reporting to
the WHO DG. (Rec. 2)

Lines of Authority For Incident Management

The Programme should be headed by an Executive Director reporting to the WHO DG, who
will remain ultimately accountable for incident management. When WHO declares a global
health emergency, the Executive Director should appoint an Incident Manager to coordinate
WHO’s response. Incident Managers, heads of Country Ofﬁces, and Regional Directors
should establish good working relationships and be held accountable. To maintain ﬂexibility,
lines of authority for incident management should shift from their default positions, depending
on the severity of the outbreak or emergency. (Rec. 3)

Strategic Collaboration Between WHO and Health
Partners at the National Level

As a standard component of its operational planning, WHO should undertake a stakeholder
analysis at the national level to identify potential health partners. This analysis should look
beyond traditional government ministry partners to include private sector actors, civil society
organizations, and faith-based groups. WHO should review the appropriate partners for coleadership of Health Clusters at the national level and work with partners to build a dedicated
capacity for coordination, planning, information management, and communications. WHO
should integrate the capacities of its Health Cluster partners in its emergency preparedness
and planning. (Rec. 4)

Reform of WHO Operations & Governance

WHO must urgently develop new business processes governing procurement and logistics,
as well as the rapid deployment of human and ﬁnancial resources, during outbreaks and
emergencies. These processes should be tailored to support the Programme for Outbreaks
and Emergencies and should not be the same as those used for WHO’s ordinary business
operations. Benchmarks should be established to assess whether these new processes are
timely and effectively implemented. (Rec. 5)

Increase Member State Assessed Contributions

WHO should make a clear distinction between the resources necessary to support the
baseline capacity of the Programme for Outbreaks and Emergencies and funding needed to
support speciﬁc emergency operations. Predictable and reliable ﬁnancing streams, including
assessed contributions from member states, should fund the baseline capacity of the
Programme. Member states must be willing to provide the resources for the Programme to
meet expectations. (Rec. 6(a), (b))

Contingency Fund For Rapid Response

For programmatic funding to support emergency operations, WHO should maximize its use of
existing funding mechanisms, such as the Central Emergency Response Fund managed by
the Emergency Relief Coordinator on behalf of the UN SG, and actively seek the full
capitalization (US $100 million) of the new Contingency Fund for Rapid Response. (Rec. 6(c))

Resource Mobilization& Political Engagement

WHO should exercise transparency in resource management by showing how existing
resources can be used more efﬁciently, by clearly articulating the linkages between resources
and speciﬁc outcomes, by identifying benchmarks to assess progress on deliverable
outcomes, and by rigorously tracking its expenditures. WHO should communicate a broader
vision of its role that explains how investing in the Programme for Outbreaks and
Emergencies will be cost-effective. WHO also should more narrowly tailor its political
engagement, soliciting input from donors and stakeholders. (Rec. 7)

Accountability & Oversight

The WHO DG should establish an external, independent oversight body to monitor the
performance of the Programme for Outbreaks and Emergencies using benchmarks
established for this purpose. Members of the oversight body should have technical expertise
in areas relevant to the operation of the Programme. The membership should be multisectoral and may be drawn from member states, donors, NGOs, civil society, the private
sector, and the UN system. (Rec. 8)

doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002042.t007
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Whether the Programme meets the panels’ standards for a quasi-independent Centre of high
quality and accountability remains to be determined. Currently, the Programme has no sustained funding or independent governance. However, the Director-General is establishing an
Independent Oversight and Advisory Committee to monitor and oversee the Programme’s
performance.

The United Nations System
When a health crisis escalates to a humanitarian disaster, even a well-resourced WHO will be
unable to galvanize political will and coordinate a broader response, requiring operational control to shift to the United Nations. Table 8 highlights the commissions’ recommendations on
the UN’s role and responsibilities during a health crisis. WHO should advise the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator to make this determination based on criteria for a Level 3 emergency
(the highest level), including the epidemic’s scale, economic toll, and political destabilization
[18]. The UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee, “the primary mechanism for inter-agency
coordination of humanitarian assistance,” [19] would establish procedures for UN inter-agency
coordination [6].
A UN Security Council resolution would elevate a crisis to the top tier of the global agenda.
As binding international law, a Council resolution would be more effective in mobilizing
resources, sustaining political will, and securing state compliance with WHO recommendations. The Secretary-General could also appoint a special envoy or establish a mission to implement Security Council directives [6].
It is also important to ensure ongoing UN engagement during inter-crisis periods. The UN
High-Level Panel recommended the General Assembly form a Council on Global Health Crises, while the Harvard/LSHTM panel proposed a standing Global Health Committee within
the Security Council. Creating a standing presence in a UN organ and, where necessary, declaring a Level 3 Emergency would raise the public and political profile of global health security in
ways WHO has been unable to achieve.
Table 8. Recommendations from the Four Global Commissions Concerning Global Governance—Ongoing UN Reform.

Improve
Coordination
and Cooperation

System-Wide
Accountability

CGHRF

Harvard/LSHTM

UN Panel

WHO Interim Assessment

The UN and WHO should
establish clear mechanisms for
coordination and escalation in
health crises, including those
that become part of broader
humanitarian crises that require
the mobilization of the entire UN
system. (Rec. C.4)

The UN SC should establish
a Global Health Committee to
elevate the level of attention
paid to public health issues
and to mobilize political
leadership. (Rec. 8)

In the event of a Grade 2 or
Grade 3 outbreak not already
classiﬁed as a humanitarian
emergency, a clear line of
command should be activated
throughout the UN system.
(Rec. 8) The SG should
integrate the UN’s health and
humanitarian crisis trigger
systems. (Rec. 9)

WHO should coordinate its
emergency grades and its
criteria for declaring a PHEIC
with the emergency levels
applied in the broader
humanitarian system to
facilitate better inter-agency
cooperation. (Rec. 18)

No recommendation.

An independent UN
Accountability Commission,
reporting to WHA and the UN
SC, should be established to
perform system-wide
assessments of worldwide
responses to disease
outbreaks. (Rec. 5)

The UN GA should create a
High-Level Council on Global
Public Health Crises to track
the implementation of reforms
and to monitor political and
other non-health issues that
may affect prevention and
preparedness. (Rec. 26)

The UN should put global
health issues at the top of its
security agenda and refer
signiﬁcant threats to the SC.
(Rec. 6) When a crisis
escalates, the UN SG should
consider the appointment of
Special Representative or
Special Envoy. (Rec. 21)

doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002042.t008
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Research and Development (R&D)
The Ebola and Zika epidemics revealed systemic deficiencies in R&D for diagnostic tests, vaccines, and therapies. The paucity of medical technologies stem primarily from low commercial
priority, limited funding, and practical challenges of conducting human trials for episodic
infections. Yet medical countermeasures are vital to contain outbreaks and minimize their
impact.
As highlighted by the recommendations in Table 9, WHO has a central role in establishing
the normative framework for R&D including priority setting, accelerating trial design and
administration, regulatory pathways, and equitable access. The Organization spearheaded an
international effort for an Ebola vaccine. More recently, WHO identified eight pathogens as
research priorities, but at a high level of generality [20]. In March 2016, WHO published more
granular priorities for Zika, including vector control [21]. Vaccine platform technologies may
be able to accelerate the development of a vaccine for the Zika virus, as well as other pathogens.
Yet, even with expedited vaccine development, inadequate access to existing vaccines still persists. For example, Yellow Fever vaccine stockpiles during a recent outbreak have been
exhausted. CGHRF recommended an independent Pandemic Product Development Committee to mobilize resources, coordinate public/private actors, and create a strategic R&D plan.
CGHRF, joined by other panels, urged $1 billion incremental funding per year from combined governmental and private sources to jumpstart research innovations (Table 10). Beyond
Table 9. Recommendations from the Four Global Commissions Concerning Research and Development—R&D Acceleration.
CGHRF

Harvard/LSHTM

UN Panel

WHO Interim Assessment

WHO’s Role in
R&D

WHO should establish an
independent Pandemic Product
Development Committee
(PPDC), accountable to the
Technical Governing Board, to
spearhead its efforts to
galvanize and prioritize R&D.
(Rec. D.1)

No recommendation.

WHO should coordinate the
prioritization of R&D efforts to
combat neglected diseases that
pose the greatest risk of turning
into global health crises. (Rec.
13)

WHO should play a central
convening role in R&D efforts
during future emergencies,
including efforts to accelerate
the development of appropriate
diagnostics, vaccines,
therapeutics, and information
technology. (Rec. 16)

Accelerating
R&D

By the end of 2016, the PPDC
should convene national
regulators, industry
stakeholders, and research
organizations to accelerate
R&D by promoting regulatory
convergence; the pre-approval
of clinical trial designs;
mechanisms to manage
intellectual property, data
sharing, and product liability;
and efforts to expedite vaccine
manufacture, stockpiling, and
distribution. (Rec. D.3)

Governments, researchers,
private industry, and nongovernmental organizations
must develop a framework of
norms and rules operating
during and between outbreaks
to enable and accelerate
research, govern the conduct of
research, and ensure access to
the beneﬁts of research. (Rec.
6)

No recommendation.

No recommendation.

No recommendation.

No recommendation.

WHO should lead efforts to
assist developing countries in
building research and
manufacturing capacities for
vaccines, therapeutics, and
diagnostics, including through
South-South cooperation. (Rec.
16)

No recommendation.

R&D in
Developing
Countries

doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002042.t009
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Table 10. Recommendations from the Four Global Commissions Concerning Research and Development—Financing.

Global Financing
Facility for
Infectious Diseases
with Pandemic
Potential

CGHRF

Harvard/LSHTM

UN Panel

The PPDC should work with global
R&D stakeholders to catalyze the
commitment of US$1 billion per
annum to fund a portfolio of
projects to develop drugs,
vaccines, diagnostics, protective
equipment, and medical devices to
combat communicable diseases.
(Rec. D.2)

The UN SG and WHO DG
should convene a summit of
public, private, and non-proﬁt
research funders to establish a
global ﬁnancing facility for the
development of outbreakrelevant drugs, vaccines,
diagnostics, and supplies for
which commercial incentives are
insufﬁcient. (Rec. 7)

WHO should oversee an
international fund of at least US$1
billion per annum to support R&D
of vaccines, therapeutics, and
rapid diagnostics for
communicable diseases neglected
by the commercial market. (Rec.
22)

WHO Interim
Assessment
No
recommendation.

doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002042.t010

medical technologies, targeted investments would facilitate manufacturing capacity in lowerincome countries, improve personal protective equipment effectiveness, enhance information
systems, and integrate the study of zoonotic pathogens into ongoing research. The commissions placed a premium on scientifically and ethically rigorous trial designs and research participants’ rights.
Research requires sharing biological materials, but governments sometimes delay. Concerned about affordable access to the fruits of research, states have claimed sovereignty over
viruses under the 2010 Nagoya Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity. The Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework—negotiated by WHO—requires states to
share biological materials and pharmaceutical companies to provide reciprocal benefits, such
as a share of the resulting drugs or vaccines. The PIP Framework, however, applies only to pandemic influenza and not to other novel pathogens. The UN High-Level Panel recommended
that WHO re-negotiate the PIP Framework to expand its scope and make it legally binding.

System-wide Accountability
Implementing the commissions’ bold agenda requires system-wide accountability. Figs 2 and 3
demonstrate the commissions’ suggested accountability frameworks during both inter-crisis
and global health emergency periods. All frameworks would require continual communication
and inter-agency collaboration, as well as partnerships with multiple stakeholders. The UN
High-Level Panel called for a Summit on Global Public Health Crises in 2018 to assess implementation. The Harvard/LSHTM Panel went further, proposing a UN Accountability Commission to oversee the full range of actors [3].
The commissions proposed greater WHO accountability, including independent oversight
of a future CEPR. To conform with WHO’s Constitution, accountability would reside in the
Executive Board to which the new Centre would report, with full transparency. The Independent Oversight and Advisory Committee of the newly established WHO Health Emergencies
Programme will report to the Executive Board, but ultimate authority rests with the DirectorGeneral for WHO’s work in health emergencies.
Holding sovereign governments accountable poses the greatest challenge. States have sometimes failed to promptly report potential PHEICs or share crucial health information. Many
states have erected unnecessary travel and trade restrictions or infringed on human rights. The
commissions unanimously recommended that the Director-General publicly name governments that fail to act as responsible global citizens [22]. Beyond transparency, it may be possible to coax states’ compliance with their IHR obligations through skilled diplomacy and
incentives.
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Fig 2. Accountability frameworks proposed by the four commissions during inter-emergencies period. (A) Commission on a
Global Health Risk Framework for the Future, (B) Harvard-London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine’s Independent Panel on
the Global Response to Ebola, (C) United Nations High-Level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises, (D) World Health
Organization Ebola Interim Assessment Panel. * denotes individual/body with responsibility for declaring a Public Health Emergency
of International Concern (PHEIC). CEPR = Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response, DG = Director-General,
ED = Executive Director, PPDC = Pandemic Product Development Committee, SG = Secretary-General, UN = United Nations,
WHA = World Health Assembly, WHO = World Health Organization.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002042.g002
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Fig 3. Changes to the accountability frameworks during a PHEIC that has turned into a humanitarian crisis. (A)
Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future, (B) Harvard-London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine’s
Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola, (C) United Nations High-Level Panel on the Global Response to Health
Crises, (D) World Health Organization Ebola Interim Assessment Panel. CEPR = Centre for Emergency Preparedness and
Response, DG = Director-General, ED = Executive Director, ERC = Emergency Response Coordinator, OCHA = Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, SG = Secretary-General, UN = United Nations, WHO = World Health Organization.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1002042.g003
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Political Leadership
The commissions’ proposals are ambitious, with action needed everywhere from civil society
and research laboratories to Geneva and national capitals. Political attention to global health
security can no longer be episodic, limited to when an epidemic strikes. Political leadership
must be sustained by standing agendas on health security at the WHA, G7, G20, and Security
Council, with the United Nations overseeing crucial reforms. The commissions have defined a
path forward. It would be a reckless disregard for human life and security to resist vital reforms.
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